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Abstract – The world in which we are living is a huge network of networks and should be de-
scribed by interdependent networks. The interdependence between networks significantly affects
the evolutionary dynamics of cooperation on them. Meanwhile, due to the diversity and complex-
ity of social and biological systems, players on different networks may not interact with each other
by the same way, which should be described by multiple models in evolutionary game theory, such
as the Prisoner’s Dilemma and Snowdrift Game. We therefore study the evolutionary dynamics
of cooperation on two interdependent networks playing different games respectively. We clearly
evidence that, with the increment of network interdependence, the evolution of cooperation is
dramatically promoted on the network playing Prisoner’s Dilemma. The cooperation level of the
network playing Snowdrift Game reduces correspondingly, although it is almost invisible. In par-
ticular, there exists an optimal intermediate region of network interdependence maximizing the
growth rate of the evolution of cooperation on the network playing Prisoner’s Dilemma. Remark-
ably, players contacting with other network have advantage in the evolution of cooperation than
the others on the same network.
Introduction. – The problem of cooperation repre-
sents a social dilemma characterized by the conflict of in-
terest between group and individuals. The understanding
of emergence and maintenance of cooperation among unre-
lated individuals in real world is still one of the most chal-
lenging problems in social and biological systems. Evo-
lutionary game theory provides a uniform mathematical
framework to deal with this challenge [1, 2]. The Pris-
oner’s Dilemma (PD) and Snowdrift Game (SG) are con-
sidered as two of the most typical paradigms of investigat-
ing cooperation in social dilemmas. They are both two-
person games, where cooperators are prone to exploitation
by defectors and the accumulated payoffs of populations
are lower than that of pure cooperators [3].
In conventional forms, both PD and SG are played by
two individuals deciding simultaneously whether to coop-
erate or defect. Players both receive R by mutual co-
operation, whereas mutual defection results in payoff P
for both of them. The highest payoff T is obtained by a
player defecting against a cooperator, while the coopera-
tor bearing the cost of S. In the PD, T > R > P > S is
achieved. Consequently, it is best for individuals to defect
regardless of the co-player’s decision. And, defection is the
evolutionarily stable strategy (ESS) in well-mixed infinite
populations, even though individuals would be better off
if they cooperated [4]. Thus, social dilemma is obvious.
While in the SG, payoffs P and S have a reverse order,
T > R > S > P , which fundamentally changes the situa-
tion and leads to persistence of cooperation. As a result,
the replicator dynamics of the SG converges to a mixed
stable equilibrium where cooperators and defectors coex-
ist. In this state, the population payoff is smaller than
that of full cooperation, hence the SG still represents a
social dilemma [5].
Several mechanisms have been proposed in different
contexts to elucidate the ubiquitous cooperative behav-
iors, such as kin selection, direct reciprocity, indirect reci-
procity, network reciprocity and group selection [6]. In ad-
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dition, voluntary participation [7], stochastic interactions
[8, 9], social diversity [10, 11], co-evolution [12–15], migra-
tion [16], punishment [17], reward [18], coordinated invest-
ments [19], Matthew effect [20], adaptive and bounded in-
vestment returns [21] and conditional strategies [22] have
been put under tight study, which provide a good begin-
ning for exploration of the dynamics of cooperation on
interdependent networks [23–27]. Subsequently, multiplex
structure [28], biased utility functions [29], probabilistic
interconnection [30], interdependent network reciprocity
[31] and co-evolution [32,33] have been studied intensively
to reveal the intrinsic mechanisms of evolutionary dynam-
ics of cooperation on interdependent networks.
Nevertheless, all the works mentioned above are tradi-
tionally modelled as the same games on interdependent
networks. We note that, in social behaviors and biologi-
cal activities, individuals of distinct regions may engage in
different interactions with their local neighbors. In partic-
ular, strategic information can be shared between regions
by information transmission [34]. Consequently, this phe-
nomenon should be considered as different game models
played respectively on interdependent networks in evolu-
tionary game theory. Thus, it is interesting to study the
evolutionary dynamics of cooperation in a more realistic
system constructed by at least two interdependent net-
works playing different games, such as PD and SG, and
far less attention has been paid to this type of system.
For simplicity and focusing on the interdependence be-
tween networks, we employ two identical spatial structures
A and B of the same size, where PD is played on net-
work A and SG no network B. Individuals on networks
A and B can only play with their local nearest neighbors
of the same network, where network interdependence can-
not influence the payoffs of individuals directly on both
networks. However, in the strategy adoption process, de-
pending on the interdependence between networks with a
certain probability p, individuals of both networks can-
not only learn from their local nearest neighbors, but also
from the long-range corresponding one on the other net-
work. That is, interdependent networks can contact and
influence each other by probability p, which is described
by the network interdependence. We also assume that, for
p = 0, A has no connection to B, where networks A and
B are totally separated and cannot influence each other.
In the opposite limit, p = 1, all the individuals on A and
B are completely correlated in order. For 0 < p < 1, the
network interdependence between A and B is subject to
a binomial distribution. In this way, individuals on differ-
ent networks can influence each other and evolve together.
We find that the evolution of cooperation on network A
prospers dramatically with increasing p. The impact of
network interdependence on A is much stronger than that
on B. Surprisingly, there exists an intermediate region of p
leading to the maximum growth rate of cooperation level
on network A. Moreover, the interdependence between
networks fundamentally affects the evolution of coopera-
tion on two networks, where the formation of clusters are
changed significantly. This system may truly reflect the
realistic characteristics of multiplicity and diversity in so-
cial and biological systems.
Model. – In order to focus explicitly on the impact
of interdependence between two interdependent networks
and easily compare our results with previous works, net-
works A and B employed in our work are both two-
dimensional L×L square lattices with periodic boundary
conditions and von Neumman neighborhoods, which have
no empty sites. In this situation, networks A and B have
the same population size, NA = NB, and all the players
are surrounded by M = 4 local nearest neighbors. We
assume that PD and SG are played respectively on net-
works A and B. Initially, players are designated either as
a cooperator or a defector with equal probability on inter-
dependent networks. It is emphasized that, in the game
process, players on both networks can only interact with
their local nearest neighbors on the same network to ob-
tain their accumulated payoffs. The payoff matrices for
PD and SG can be conveniently rescaled depending on a
single parameter r correspondingly. For the PD, we get(
1 −r
1 + r 0
)
.
For the SG, we get(
1 1− r
1 + r 0
)
.
In this work, r is constrained to the internal [0, 1]. Thus,
players on both networks can accumulate their payoffs Π
by interacting with their local nearest neighbors on the
same network. While, in the strategy adoption process,
the condition is a little more complicated. Players on both
networks cannot only learn from their local nearest neigh-
bors, but also from one corresponding long-range neighbor
on the other network with equiprobability, if they are se-
lected with probability p to connect with this correspond-
ing player on the other network. It is noted that, prob-
ability p is used to describe the network interdependence
between interdependent networks. And, each player can
only connect with no more than one player of the same po-
sition on the other network with probability p. Following
the accumulation of payoffs Πx and Πy , player x, whether
from A or B, is allowed to learn from a random neighbor
y. Note that, as we described above, the random neighbor
y maybe a local nearest neighbor, or a corresponding one
from the other network if allowed. Employing the Monte
Carlo simulation procedure, player x adopts the strategy
of player y with a probability determined by the difference
of their payoffs
W(x←y) =
1
1 + exp[(Πx −Πy)/κ]
, (1)
where characterizes the noise effects in the strategy adop-
tion process. 0 < κ ≪ 1 implies that the better perform-
ing player is readily adopted, whereas large values κ > 1
constitute the weak selection limit. And, our simulation
results are robust for different κ when p > 0. Follow-
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Fig. 1: The evolution of cooperation on two interdependent
networks as a function of r with different values of p.
ing a previous study, we simply set κ = 0.1 in this work
[35], and mainly focus on the impact of interdependence
between interdependent networks.
Simulation and analysis. – In the following, we will
show the simulation results of the impact of interdepen-
dence on the evolution of cooperation on two interdepen-
dent networks of size 100× 100 respectively to avoid finite
size effects. We define that ρc is the density of cooperators
on network. Thus, ρac is the density of cooperators on net-
work A, and ρbc the density of cooperators on network B
correspondingly. In this work, we adopt the synchronous
Monte Carlo simulation update manner. Unless otherwise
stated, all the simulation results shown below are required
up to 104 generations and then sampled by another 103
generations. The results of fractions of cooperators are av-
eraged over 50 different realizations of initial conditions.
We first study how the network interdependence influ-
ences the evolution of cooperation on two networks. Fig. 1
presents the frequencies of cooperators on interdependent
networks as a function of r with different p. Remarkably,
as shown in Fig. 1(a), the evolution of cooperation on net-
work A prospers with increasing p, which even achieves
the full cooperation state when r = 0 for p = 1.0. That is
because cooperation is the dominant strategy on network
B deducing from our payoff matrices, when r = 0. The
evolution of cooperation on network A therefore benefits
from network B by the network interdependence. More-
over, comparing with p = 0, cooperators on network A can
remain alive for much bigger r when p > 0. As we know,
it is best for individuals to defect in the PD regardless of
co-player’s decision [4]. Thus, the evolution of coopera-
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Fig. 2: The frequencies of cooperation on two interdependent
networks as a function of p with different values of r.
tion can easily vanish in the isolated spatial PD, where
p = 0 in Fig. 1(a). Nevertheless, with the development of
interdependence between networks, the evolution of coop-
eration on network A is significantly affected by network
B which is playing SG. However, as shown in Fig. 1(b),
the cooperation level on network B decreases slightly with
increasing p. This phenomenon shows that the evolution
of cooperation on network B is also affected by network A
through network interdependence between them. Thus, in
this system, the impact of interdependence is mutual on
both networks, even though it is much stronger on network
A than that on network B.
To investigate the role of interdependence intuitively, we
present the frequencies of cooperation on two networks as
a function of p with different r in Fig. 2. The results shown
in Fig. 2(a) clearly evidence that the evolution of coopera-
tion on network A is significantly promoted by the interde-
pendence between networks. But, the degree of promotion
decreases with increasing r. For r = 0, the cooperation
level on network A even achieves the full cooperation state
when p ≥ 0.88, which is in accordance with the results
shown in Fig. 1(a). Whereas, if predictable, the evolu-
tion of cooperation on network B declines scarcely with
different r, as shown in Fig. 2(b). Thus, the impact of
network interdependence on the evolution of cooperation
on network B is negative and minimal. Consequently, the
impact of network interdependence is inequality on net-
works A and B due to their different ways of interacting.
In Fig. 3, we define a quantity of the growth rate of
cooperation Gc to investigate the specific variation of the
cooperation level on one individual network with proba-
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Fig. 3: The growth rates of cooperation level on two inter-
dependent networks as a function of p with different r. The
black dashed line indicates the base line of coordinates axis.
ra and rb indicate parameter r for the evolution of cooperation
on networks A and B respectively.
bility p.
Gc = dρc/dp, (2)
where dρc is the gradient of ρc, and dp the gradient of p
correspondingly. Thus, Gac denotes the growth rate of co-
operation on network A, and Gbc the growth rate of coop-
eration on network B correspondingly. As shown in Fig. 3,
for each fixed r, Gac is always beyond the base line with
increasing p, which is greater than 0. It means that the
existence of network interdependence improves the coop-
erative behaviors on network A, when p > 0. However, the
results are inverse on network B, where Gbc is always un-
der the base line for each fixed r. More importantly, there
exists an optimal intermediate region of p maximizing the
growth rate of the evolution of cooperation on network A
evidently. In other words, there exists an stationary point
for the increment of cooperation level on network A when
p > 0, which is around p = 0.8 for each fixed r. This result
effectively proves that although the evolution of coopera-
tion on network A grows with increasing p, the growth
rate of cooperation level is nonlinear. And, the promotion
of cooperative behaviors is weakened on network A with
increasing r. Conversely, the growth rates of the coopera-
tion level on network B are monotonously decreased with
different r. And, the decrement of cooperation level on
network B is strengthened with increasing r. Thus, the
impact of interdependence on the evolution of cooperation
is imbalanced on two interdependent networks.
In order to investigate the effect of network interdepen-
dence intensively, we calculate the frequencies of corre-
lated strategies, such as CC, for corresponding individu-
als between networks as a function of p with different r
in Fig. 4. Interestingly, as shown in Fig. 4, the frequen-
cies of CC strategies between networks are pretty similar
to the evolution of cooperation on network A as shown
in Fig. 2(a) for corresponding r. This phenomenon in-
dicates that the interdependence between networks influ-
ences the evolution of cooperation on network A directly.
To study the role of correlated CC strategies between net-
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Fig. 4: The frequencies of correlated CC strategies between
interdependent networks as a function of p with different r.
works quantitatively, we employ the simplified correlation
coefficient to describe the relationship between CC strate-
gies and network A [30].
rac = (ρCC − ρ
2
ac)/(ρac − ρ
2
ac), (3)
where ρCC is the fraction of CC strategies between two
networks. We obtain that rac almost equals to 1 with dif-
ferent r, when 0 < ρac < 1. It means that the spreading
of cooperative behaviors of individuals on network A is
perfectly correlated with the network interdependence be-
tween interdependent networks. In other words, the net-
work interdependence can fundamentally affect the evolu-
tionary dynamics of cooperation on network A. In addi-
tion, the results clearly evidence that the interdependence
between networks plays similar role on the evolution of
cooperation on network A as the probabilistic intercon-
nection between interdependent networks [30, 31].
We present the frequencies of cooperation of individuals
on network A who are selected to build connections with
corresponding individuals on network B as a function of p
with different r in Fig. 5, to compare with the individuals
who can only learn from the local nearest neighbors on
the same network. The results clearly evidence that the
cooperation level of individuals contacting with network
B is much more prosperous than the other individuals on
network A, as shown in Fig. 5(a). This means that these
individuals have an advantage in the evolution of coop-
eration than the other individuals on network A by the
interdependence between networks. However on network
B, in Fig. 5(b), individuals contacting with network A
are on the opposite position, which is at a disadvantage
in the evolution of cooperation. Thus, the impact of net-
work interdependence on the evolution of cooperation on
networks A and B is not the win-win situation.
To investigate the evolution of cooperation on interde-
pendent networks intuitively, we present the time evolu-
tion of typical distributions of cooperators and defectors
on both networks with a prepared initial state in Fig. 6,
which serves well to highlight two significantly different
strategy invasion processes on networks. We find that,
with the impact of network interdependence, cooperators
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Fig. 5: The cooperation level of individuals on interdependent
networks have (re) and do not have (ri) connections with the
other network as a function of p with different r.
in the middle domain on network A can survive by forming
large and compact clusters initially to reduce the exploita-
tion by defectors. And, a small number of cooperators
appear in the domain of defectors at the beginning phase.
Whereas, the evolution of cooperation on network B pros-
pers by taking advantage of network A. However, with
time evolution, cooperators in the middle domain on net-
work A cannot form effective clusters and are gradually
eroded by the defectors around, then to reach the steady
state. Ultimately, the evolution of cooperation on net-
work A can only survive by the interdependence between
interdependent networks. On the contrary, although the
middle domain of cooperators is gradually eroded by de-
fectors on network B, the evolution of cooperation pros-
pers and the domain of cooperators expands to the whole
network. In the steady state, cooperators on network A
cannot form large and compact clusters to survive [36].
They have to draw support from network B. The distri-
bution of cooperators on network A is therefore scattered.
Whereas on network B, the evolution of cooperation is af-
fected not only by themselves but also by network A. Con-
sequently, the formation of cooperators does not present
small filament-like clusters [4], but the intermediate state
between the large compact clusters and the small filament-
like clusters. Thus, the interdependence between networks
fundamentally influences the evolutionary dynamics of co-
operation on both networks simultaneously.
Discussion and conclusion. – We have studied the
evolutionary dynamics of cooperation on interdependent
networks playing different games, PD and SG. In this
work, two individual networks cannot affect the payoffs
of individuals on the other network. Instead, strategic in-
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Fig. 6: Time evolution of typical distributions of cooperators
(red) and defectors (blue) on networks A and B obtained by
r = 0.3 and p = 0.7 with a prepared initial state.
formation is transmitted between networks to affect the
evolution of cooperation on both of them. Coinciden-
tally, Santos et al.explored the evolution of cooperation
on interdependent networks with PD and SG [38]. In
their work, two networks are modeled as regular random
graphs, where individuals on both networks establish intra
links with neighbors of the same layer, and inter links with
neighbors of the opposite layer. Biased imitation is intro-
duced to investigate the final level of cooperation reached
in each network. They showed that as the probability to
imitate neighbors from the opposite network increases, the
final level of cooperation both networks behaves differently
regardless of the population structure. While in our work,
the evolution of cooperation is significantly promoted on
the network playing PD with the increment of interde-
pendence between networks. And, the impact of network
interdependence on the network playing SG is negative
and slightly. It is known that, on an isolated single square
lattice, the evolution of cooperation is promoted in PD
whereas inhibited in SG, compared with the well-mixed
situation [4,36]. While in our work, with increasing p, the
evolution of cooperation is promoted on network A which
is playing PD, but inhibited on network B which is playing
SG. This phenomenon clearly evidence that the introduc-
tion of interdependence between networks stimulates the
promotion of cooperation more conductive in PD, but en-
hances the inhibition greater in SG. Moreover, Ohtsuki et
al.showed that it is always harder for cooperators to evolve
whenever the interaction graph and replacement graph do
not coincide [39]. However, the simulation results for PD
network in our work are not in line with this, which pro-
vides a more general evolutionary dynamics of cooperation
on interdependent networks.
In addition, there exists an optimal region of inter-
mediate interdependence maximizing the growth rate of
the evolution of cooperation on network A. Instead, the
growth rate of cooperation level on network B declines
monotonously. Meanwhile, the promotion of the evolution
of cooperation on network A is weakened with increasing
r. While on network B, the evolution of cooperation de-
p-5
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creases faster with increasing r. The role of CC strategies
of corresponding individuals on both networks have been
studied intensively by meas of calculating the frequencies
of CC strategies between networks and the correlation co-
efficient of CC strategies on network A. Remarkably, the
frequency of CC strategies is pretty similar to the evolu-
tion of cooperation on network A as a function of p with
different r, where the evolution of cooperation on network
A is perfect correlation with the frequency of CC strategies
for corresponding r. Then, we have investigated the co-
operation level of individuals on both networks contacting
with the corresponding individuals on the other network
to compare with the individuals playing with local nearest
neighbors on the same network. On network A, individ-
uals contacting with the other network have advantages
in the evolution of cooperation than other individuals on
the same network. However, it is just the opposite on
network B. Thus, the impact of network interdependence
on the evolution of cooperation is imbalanced on two net-
works. Moreover, the snapshots of evolutionary dynamics
of cooperation on two networks have shown that network
interdependence fundamentally influences the formation
of clusters on both networks.
In summary, the games on interdependent networks
studied here are not meant to model a particular real-
life situation. They nevertheless do capture the essence
of some situations that are viable in reality. The evolu-
tionary dynamics of cooperation on interdependent net-
works with different games may describe the relationship
between structured populations with different behaviors.
And, different populations can fundamentally influence
each other by sharing information. By means of this sim-
ple model, we would like to reveal the internal mecha-
nisms of how players on interdependent networks affect
each other in the evolution of cooperation in real world.
Although this model is simple and cannot include every
kind of circumstances existing, we hope this beneficial at-
tempt can highlight the way to explore the evolutionary
dynamics of cooperation on interdependent networks.
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